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AGENT CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY:
A REPLY TO FLINT
Michael Bergmann

In an earlier paper I argued that if we help ourselves to Molinism, we can
give a counterexample - one avoiding the usual difficulties - to the
Principle of Alternate Possibilities:
PAP.

A person is morally responsible for performing a given act
only if she could have acted otherwise.

Thomas Flint has proposed three objections to my counterexample. In this
paper I respond to each.

In my "Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will
Defense,"l I argued that if we help ourselves to Molinism, we can give a
counterexample - one avoiding the usual difficulties - to the Principle of
Alternate Possibilities:
PAP. A person is morally responsible for performing a given act only
if she could have acted otherwise.
In his "On Behalf of the PAP-ists: A Reply to Bergmann,"2 Thomas Flint
proposes three objections to my counterexample. In what follows, I
respond to each.
1. Two Preliminary Matters

Before considering Flint's three objections, it will be helpful if I begin by (i)
explaining the way in which I use the term 'agent cause' (since it features
so prominently in my counterexample and in my discussion of Flint's three
objections) and (ii) briefly describing the counterexample I proposed.
I use the term agent cause' as follows:
I

AC. X is the agent cause of e iff each of the following three conditions is satisfied:
1. X is a substance that had the power to bring about e
2. X exerted its power to bring about e
3. nothing distinct from X (not even X's character) caused X to
exert its power to bring about e.
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This is a slight modification of the typical Reidian understanding of agent
causation, which, according to William Rowe, is just like the above except
that it replaces 3 with:
3*. X had the power to refrain from bringing about e. 3
Rowe argues that 3* entails 3.4 That seems plausible. And if it's true, then
agent causation, as I understand it, seems to be weaker than the Reidian
notion of agent causation insofar as my sort of agent causation seems to be
entailed by the Reidian sort without entailing it.
With this understanding of agent causation in mind, let's consider my
proposed counterexample. There is an agent, Jones, of whom the following subjunctive conditional of agent causation is true:
A. If from t* up until t Jones were in circumstances K and Demon
didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI [a volition to
pull the trigger of the gun in Jones's hand], then Jones would agentcause VI at t.
There is also a powerful being, Demon, with knowledge of subjunctive
conditionals of agent causation such as A (here'S where the Molinist component comes in). In addition to having such knowledge, Demon also
knows that Jones will be in circumstances K from t* up until t. Since
Demon knows all this and wants Jones to agent-cause VI at t (Le., to pull
the trigger, which will result in Smith's death), Demon is happy /lot to take
away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI. However, the following counterfactual is true of Demon:
C. If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would
take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI.
In fact, if A were false, not only would Demon take away Jones' powers at t

with respect to VI, Demon would himself cause Jones to cause VI, thereby
ensuring Smith's death. Finally, the antecedent of A is true (which, given
the truth of A, implies that the consequent of A is true as well). I argued
that in this example, Jones couldn't do otherwise than agent-cause VI even
though Jones is responsible for Vl,5
II. Flint's First Objection

Flint's first objection focuses on my claim that Jones is responsible for VI.
To see exactly what his objection is targeting, it will be helpful to summarize the two points I made in defense of that claim. First, I noted that Jones
would clearly be responsible for VI if he agent-caused VI when Demon
wasn't present. This is because, if Jones agent-causes VI, the causal buck
for VI stops with Jones. Second, I claimed that changing the case to
include Demon (in the way described in my counterexample) won't
change anything relevant since, in the Demon case, Jones does exactly
what he does in the Demon-less case and "he does so with absolutely no
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interference or influence from Demon".6 It is this second point that Flint's
objection targets. For, says Flint, the fact that Jones's powers to do otherwise than agent-cause VI are removed when we add Demon to the situation "makes nonsense of the claim that there has been no interference or
influence".7 Perhaps I didn't state that second point as carefully as I should
have. I didn't intend to say that there was no way in which the addition of
Demon to the situation affects Jones. Clearly it does. My point was just
that the addition of Demon to the situation results in no interference with
or influence on Jones's agent-causing of Vl.8 In both the Demon case and the
Demon-less case, the causal buck for VI stops with Jones. That is sufficient
for saying that Jones is responsible for VI.

III. Flint's Second Objection
Flint's second objection is that my counterexample forces us to credit
Demon with causing Jones to agent-cause VI and that this is incoherent:
Demon has set up a situation in which there's only one thing Jones
can cause, and where he can't refrain from exercising his power to cause it.
This surely seems like a situation in which Demon has caused Jones
to exercise his power to agent-cause VI. And this even Bergmann
would allow cannot be; his third condition of agent causation ...
implies that nothing distinct from Jones could cause Jones to agentcause anything. So Bergmann's counterexample may be incoherent
even on his own account of agent causation.9
This objection relies quite heavily on the point that, in my counterexample,
Jones "can't refrain from exercising his power to cause [VI]". But does my
counterexample really entail that Jones can't refrain from exercising his
power to cause VI? In the first half of his paper, Flint develops an argument
for the conclusion that my counterexample does, in fact, have that consequence. Let's take some time to consider whether that argument succeeds.
According to Flint, there is a power I don't discuss in giving my counterexample, namely, the power to non intentionally refrain from agent-causing VI, where this is distinct from the power to intentionally refrain from
agent-causing Vl. lO (To intentionally refrain from agent-causing VI
involves agent-causing the relevant intention, something not involved in
nonintentionally refraining from agent-causing VI.) Flint thinks that my
counterexample entails that Jones lacks this power to nonintentionally
refrain from agent-causing VI. For suppose that Jones had this power and
exercised it. That is, suppose that:
R. Jones refrains from agent-causing VI at t.

Flint argues that R~_Cl1 (where C is the counterfactual, mentioned earlier,
that is true of Demon in my counterexample). But that shows that if Jones
has the power to nonintentionally refrain from agent-causing VI, then
"Jones has a power the exercise of which counterfactually implies the falsity of C".'2 And that conflicts with something I say about my counterexam-
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pIe, namely, that C would be true of Demon no matter which of his powers
Jones exercisedY From this Flint concludes that my counterexample
entails that Demon takes away Jones's power to nonintentionally refrain
from agent-causing VI. That's why Flint says that, in my counterexample,
Jones can't refrain from exercising his power to cause Vl.
The reason I didn't mention this power to nonintentionally refrain from
agent-causing VI is that it isn't an active power that Jones can exercise. '4
Instead, it is the potential for something to happen to Jones. Some might
call it a passive power - something that can be activated (by something distinct from Jones); but it isn't something that can be exercised by Jones. In
fact, I don't even want to say it is a passive power to nonintentionally
refrain from agent-causing VI. The term 'refrain' has connotations of being
intentional. I prefer to think of it as Jones's potential to nonintentionally
fail to agent-cause VI.
Now suppose that I grant (as I do) that Jones has this potential to nonintentionally fail to agent-cause VI. Can Flint's argument (that R ---...-C) be
used to show that I'm in trouble? No. For now our question isn't "What
would happen if Jones were to exercise his power to nonintentionally
refrain from agent-causing VI?" Instead, the question is "What would
happen if Jones's potential to nonintentionally fail to agent-cause VI were
activated?" In other words, the question is "What would happen if
R*: Jones nonintentionally fails to agent-cause VI at t
were true?" Thus, in order to show that I'm in trouble when I allow that
Jones has the potential to nonintentionally fail to agent-cause VI, Flint
must argue that R* ---...-C
But once we replace R in Flint's argument with R*, we can see where it
goes wrong. As Flint makes clear when he lays out the argument, it
depends for its success on the validity of the following line of reasoning:
Jones could exercise his power to refrain only if Demon has not taken
away that power. And if Demon didn't take away that power, then
obviously he didn't take away all of Jones's powers. So
(ii) R ---... GI [where GI is the claim that Demon didn't take away
all ofJones's powers at t with respect to VI].15
Thus, unless R ---... GI, Flint's argument fails to show that R ---... -C And
since our focus is R* rather than R, we may conclude that, unless R* ---... Gl,
Flint's argument can't be used to show that R* ---... -C And the fact is that
R* does not counterfactually imply GI.
To see why, consider once again the following counterfactual which is
true of Demon in my counterexample:
C If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would
take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI.

When I said (in stating the consequent of C) that Demon would take away
(all of) Jones's powers at t with respect to VI, I was speaking of all of the
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active powers with respect to VI that Jones can exercise. I was not speaking
of the potentialities Jones has with respect to VI - the things that can happen to him with respect to VI. This was made evident in my description of
the example when I said that Demon would take away all of Jones's powers at t with respect to VI and that Demon himself would cause Jones to cause
VI at t. 16 For since, in that counterfactual scenario, Demon caused Jones to
cause VI at t, it is obvious that Jones still had the potential to be caused to
cause VI despite the fact that all his powers with respect to VI had been
taken away. So clearly I wasn't suggesting that Demon was taking away
all of Jones's potentialities with respect to VI; it was active powers with
respect to VI that I had in mind. Once we see this, it is easy to see that R*
doesn't counterfactually imply GI (where GI is understood to be speaking
of active powers). For the fact that Jones has the potential to nonintentionally fail to agent-cause VI doesn't counterfactually imply that Jones is left
with some active powers with respect to VI that he can exercise. Once we
see that R* doesn't counterfactually imply GI, we can (as I noted earlier)
conclude that Flint's argument can't be used to show that R* --- -CO And
from that we may conclude that it can't be used to show that my counterexample is inconsistent with the claim that Jones has the potential to
nonintentionally fail to agent-cause VI.
Now all of this is, of course, directly relevant to Flint's second objection.
For as we noted earlier, this objection relied on Flint's claim that, in my
counterexample, Jones can't refrain from exercising his power to cause VI.
If refraining from exercising the power to cause VI can include such things
as nonintentionally failing to agent-cause VI, then Flint has failed to establish that claim. If, on the other hand, it can't include such things, then we
can note that even if Jones can't refrain from exercising his power to cause
VI, he can nonintentionally fail to agent-cause VI. Either way the objection
fails. For Flint wanted to suggest that, in my counterexample, Jones was
forced to agent-cause VI. He created this impression by arguing that,
according to my counterexample, Jones couldn't even nonintentionally fail
to agent-cause VI. But as we have seen, his argument does not establish
that conclusion. 17
IV. Flint's Third Objection
Let's look briefly at the third and last of Flint's three objections. According
to this objection, my counterexample is incoherent if one understands
agent causation in the way Thomas Reid and most agency theorists understand it (vyhere clause 3 from my definition of agent causation is replaced
with 3*), rather than in the way I understand it. 1S The problem, says Flint,
is that my example entails that Jones agent-causes VI even though he lacks
the power to refrain from causing VI. And yet, if we insist upon clause 3*
instead of merely clause 3, then agent-causing VI requires the power to
refrain from causing VI. So, says Flint, on the Reidian account of agentcausation, my example is incoherent.
I have two responses. First, it is difficult to see why this observation
(even if correct) would cause any problem for me. When I described my
counterexample, I made it clear that I was thinking of agent causation as
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entailing the satisfaction of clause 3, not clause 3*. Why is it a problem for
me that my counterexample would be incoherent if understood in a way
that I explicitly said it was not to be understood? Perhaps the suggestion is
that I shouldn't be using the term' agent causation' in a non-Reidian way. I
disagree. I think that the account of agent causation I gave does a better
job than Reid's account of capturing what at least some philosophers have
in mind when thinking about agent causation.
Second, I'm not sure that my counterexample would be incoherent even
if agent causation were understood in the Reidian way. It all depends on
how we are to understand:
3*. X had the power to refrain from bringing about e.

Must X's power to refrain be thought of as an active power that X can exercise? If so, then my example would be incoherent given a Reidian account
of agent causation. Or can the power to refrain from bringing about e be
merely a passive power to have something happen to one? Can it, for
example, be merely the potential to nonintentionally fail to agent-cause e?
If so, then, in light of the remarks I made in response to Flint's second
objection, I don't see why my example would be incoherent even given a
Reidian account of agent causation.'9
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NOTES

1.

Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), 462-78.
Ibid., pp. 479-84.
3. See William Rowe, "The Metaphysics of Freedom: Reid's Theory of
Agent Causation," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly LXXIV (2000),427.
4. This is what his response to objection II on p. 430 of "The Metaphysics
of Freedom" amounts to.
5. See section 2.2 of "Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples" where I
layout this example in a little more detail.
6. "Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples,"p. 468.
7. "On Behalf of the PAP-ists," p. 482.
8. That's what I meant when I said "he does so with absolutely no interference or influence from Demon".
9. "On Behalf of the PAP-ists," p. 482 (emphasis is mine).
10. "On Behalf of the PAP-ists," p. 481.
11. I follow Flint in using the single-line arrow (~) to represent counterfactual implication.
12. "On Behalf of the PAP-ists," p. 482.
13. See premise 16 on p. 471 of my "Molinist Frankfurt-Style
Counterexamples" .
14. So I don't think it makes sense for Flint to ask, as he does, of this power
"What would have happened if Jones were to exercise it?" (See his "On Behalf
of the PAP-ists," p. 481.)
15. "On Behalf of the PAP-ists," p. 481.
16. In my original paper I said of Demon that "if he knows that Jones won't
2.
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agent-cause VI at t, he will intervene as follows: he will take away Jones's
powers at t with respect to VI and will cause VI himself at t." (See "Molinist
Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples," p. 467.)
17. It's worth noting here that weakly actualizing a state of affairs needn't
involve causing it to obtain. Thus, even if one could show that the state of
affairs Jones's agent-causing Vi were weakly actualized by Demon, that wouldn't be enough to show that Jones was forced to (or caused to) agent-cause VI.
(To weakly actualize a state of affairs, S1, is to cause the actualization of a distinct state of affairs, S2, which is such that if it were actual, SI would be actual.
For an explanation of why weakly actualizing a state of affairs needn't involve
causing it to obtain, see Plantinga's Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1974), pp. 172-73.)
18. "On Behalf of the PAP-ists," pp. 482-83.
19. Thanks to Jeffrey Brower and William Rowe for comments on earlier
drafts.

